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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Zoning. Classification of particular property by
municipal zoning ordinance must be reasonable. It must have some reasonable
relation to the public welfare and also to the uses to which the property may
reasonably be adapted. Applying this general rule, the court held a zoning
ordinance unconstitutional because it arbitrarily changed the classification of
specified property from "industrial" to "residential.'" The property in part
bordered railroad tracks, the industrial classification had existed for twenty
years previously, and the change in classification reduced the value of the
property from sixty to seventy-five dollars per front foot to five to seven dollars
per front foot. These facts seem sufficient to justify the result,
Recovery of Attorneys Fees. The court upheld the constitutionality of a
statute authorizing recovery of an attorney's fee by a successful claimant in
a summary proceeding to enforce a laborer's lien against real er personal
property where the laborer was in privity with the owner of such property.
It held that the classification of these types of wage claims was not arbitrary.'
Taxation. A municipal ordinance imposing a tax of ten per cent on gross
admission to theatres (exclusive of federal tax) was held to be outside the
scope of the municipal authority to levy license taxes.3 It was stated that the
tax was unreasonable and confiscatory within the Florida rule that a tax for
revenue purposes may be so burdensome in amount that it is unconstitutional.
The suit challenging the tax was brought before any experience with its
effect on the theatre business was had, and the result was reached on the basis
of allegations that the tax on the taxpayer would total $94,000--an increase of
12,000 per cent over previous license taxes; that the tax would be in excess of
the net income of five of the taxpayer's theatres; and that it would constitute
such a drain on the receipts of others as to discourage their operation. The
court rejected a line of cases in other states holding that before the tax can
be successfully challenged, experience with its effect must be had. On the
basis of the above facts it thought that no argument was required to establish
that the tax was unreasonable and stated that "No business can withstand
* This section of the SyNopsIs covers the cases in 42 So.2d No. 12 through 43 So.2d
No. 7.
1. West Palm Beach v. Edward U. Roddy Corp., 43 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1950).
2. Hunter v. Flowers, 43 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1949).
3. St. Petersburg v. Florida Coastal Theatres, Inc. 43 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1949).
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such an imposition." However, if the principal facts were stated in the opinion,
the court's conclusion does not appear to be inevitable. In judging the reason-
ableness of the amount of a tax before the tax is levied, the court, as in this
case, sets itself up as an economic prognosticator and makes a difficult and
uncertain prediction of the future success of a business the basis for judging
the validity of a tax. If Florida is not to follow the rule applied by the federal
courts under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 4 it
would appear that it should not prejudge the effect of the tax except in the
clearest case.
A municipal ordinance which required a greater license tax of transient
solicitors of photographs than of local photographers was held to be an undue
burden on interstate commerce on activities of an out-of-state photography
company. 5 The plaintiff challenging the tax was a photography company with
head offices in Alabama. It sent its agents to the municipality to solicit photo-
graphs to be taken and to collect a small deposit. These agents were followed
up by traveling photographers who took the pictures as ordered and collected
an additional deposit. They sent the film to Alabama for development of
proofs and after development the proofs were then sent back to the traveling
solicitors who met with the customers, and took orders for any of the pictures
from proofs they wished finished. The proofs were made up into pictures in
Alabama as ordered and the pictures were sent C.O.D. to the customers. The
court held these activities were entirely in interstate commerce and followed
the "drummer" cases in the United States Supreme Court.6 The trial court
had held that the photographing was a sufficient local incident for justification
of the license tax on the activities of the traveling photographers, but the su-
preme court application of the most recent opinion in the United States Su-
preme Court appears correct.7
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Disannexation. Referring to a case com-
mented on in a previous QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS,8 the court recently applied
the rule that land cannot be disannexed by quo warranto proceeding if it
is susceptible of municipal benefits commensurate with benefits conferred on
other property located within the municipalityY
Municipal Bonds. Two important cases concerning issuance of bonds by
counties are pertinent to issuance of bonds by municipalities and are therefore
treated in this section. They concern the application of § 6, Article 9 of
the constitution which requires a vote of freeholders of a political unit before
public debt is incurred and bonds are issued by the unit. A number of cases
4. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
5. Clan Mills Inc. of Alabama v. Tallahassee, 43 So.2cd 521 (Fla. 1949).
6. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
7. Note 5, supra.
8. Smith v. Montverde, 38 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1948); 3 MIAMI L.Q. 434 (1949); See
Comment, Legal Aspects of Municipal Incorporation, 4 MIAMI LQ. 78, 91 (1949).
9. State ex rel. Watson v. Busbee, 43 So.2d 7-11 (Fla. 1949).
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indicate that the constitutional provision does not cover issuance of bonds
for current governmental necessities or requirements of the governmental unit
when payable within budgetary requirements authorized by law, even though
the plan for the issuance of such bonds pledges the general credit of the po-
litical unit and its general powers of taxation in the sense that liens might be
created against the lands in the political unit. The general words of the con-
stitutional provision do not indicate any such rule, but it was apparently
adopted to ensure that current necessary governmental activities of political
units would not be endangered in case they could not be financed by funds at
hand. Pursuant to this rule the court has approved issuance of securities by
counties without a vote of freeholders for construction of a county jail, 10 a
county courthouse," and an auxiliary county court house. t2 But the building
of a library by a city is not such a function.'3
In a recent case the court also disapproved payment of certificates of in-
debtedness by ad valorem taxes authorized by the statute when the certificates
were issued to secure rights of way for a state highway. 4 The court em-
phasized the absence of any claim that such activity constituted an essential
function of the county government. But in contrast the court approved the
issuance of securities to finance the purchase of land for enlarging and im-
proving the Miami International Airport, although such securities were is-
sued without a vote of freeholders and were to be paid by ad valorem taxes
to the extent that other means of payment were not sufficient. 5 If the secur-
ing of rights of way for a state highway or the building of a public library
are not to be considered essential governmental requirements of the county
within the rule, then it could be urged that securing of land to make neces-
sary improvements of a county airport should not be classified as such a func-
tion. That the court experienced some difficulty in reaching its conclusion is
indicated by the fact that there were three majority opinions and one dissent-
ing opinion. Each of the majority opinions emphasized the importance of the
airport to the economic welfare of the county and the necessity of the acquisi-
tion of the land to the continued efficient functioning of the airport. The
unique position of the airport in this respect was said to make it an essential
function of government. The fact that no taxpayer challenged the transaction
was also mentioned.
This case was cited as the basis for a per curiam opinion handed down
on the same day.16 In this third case (two justices dissenting) the court ap-
10. Tapers v. Pichard, 124 Fla. 549, 169 So. 39 (1936).
1I. Posey v. Wakulla County, 148 Fla. 115, 3 So.2d 799 (1941).
12. State v. Pinellas County, 160 Fla. 549, 36 So.2d 216 (1948).
13. Bessemer Properties, Inc., v. Miami 41 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1949).
14. Yon v. Orange County, 43 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1949).
15. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Peters, 43 So.2d 448 (Fla. 1949). The court held that
the project approved involved a county purpose within constitutional limitations.
16. State v. Miami, 43 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1949).
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proved the issuance of revenue bonds by the City of Miami to enlarge city
buildings (including an auditorium) at Dinner Key, to retire indebtedness in-
curred in the original purchase of such property, to build a marina, and to
improve a city park by enlarging an auditorium and recreation hall, by ex-
tending public docks, and by widening a yacht basin. The dissenting opinion
indicates that under the financing plan the certificates would have to be paid
from general city revenues if revenues from the property proved insufficient.
These cases may greatly enlarge the concept of essential governmental
functions as outlined in previous cases. In deciding whether a particular proj-
ect involves such a function it may be that the fact the project is important to
the economic life of the political unit together with the fact that it involves
necessary expansion or improvement of already existing facilities will be de-
cisive. The importance of absence of objections by taxpayers is not clear. In
future cases, however, each of the above cases can easily be limited to its
special facts and the scope of the old rule is now left in doubt.
The Miami financing plan in the above case also included a provision for
payment by the city of reasonable rental value of Dinner Key buildings owned
by the city and to be occupied by the city into the special fund for the retire-
mient of the certificates. The dissenting opinion approved this feature.
In two other cases which were clearly governed by previous decisions
the court approved the issuance of municipal special obligation bonds without
a vote of freeholders.' 7 The court also decided that in the absence of a statu-
tory provision for public sale of municipal special obligation bonds, such bonds
may be sold at private sale. s Statutory provisions for public sale of general
bonds were not considered pertinent.
TAXATION. Tax Deeds. Previous cases indicating generally that a tax deed
description is sufficient if it establishes without confusion the identity of the
property covered were followed in a recent case.' 9 The description of the deed
in the case referred to a block in Dania, but the block referred to was clearly
not contained in any plat of the city of Dania. It was referred to in a plat of a
predecessor town, Modello. In view of all of the facts. the court thought con-
fusion was created by the description.
CRIMINAL LAw. Extradition. When a rendition warrant recites that a
copy of the indictment found or affidavit made before a magistrate certified
by the governor of the demanding state has been filed with the governor, it is
17. State v. Daytona Beach, 42 So2d 764 (Fla. 1949) ; State v. Pensacola, 43 So.2d
340 (Fla. 1949).
18. State v. Daytona Beach, 42 So.2d 764 (Fla. 1949). In Martin v. Board of
Public Instruction of Broward County, 42 So.2d 712 (Fla. 1949) the court held that
particular statutory and charter provisions did not authorize the City of Fort Lauderdale
to sell a tract of land to the Board of Public Instruction by private sale.
19. Sanford v. Major Dania, Inc., 43 So.2d 712 (Fla. 1949). Although the tax deeds
were issued under a statute with a defective title, this defect was held to be cured by a
later statute validating taxes assessed under the first statute.
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prima facie evidence of such fact.20 In a recent appeal from an order in a
habeas corpus proceeding, such a recital in the rendition warrant was chal-
lenged on the basis of stipulated facts. However, the court took judicial notice
of the record of the extradition proceedings before the governor, from which
it appeared that a properly certified affidavit had been submitted to him."
Three additional cases concerning criminal procedure will be reviewed




CONTRACTS. Action on judicial bond. When action is brought on surety
bonds filed in judicial proceedings, there appears to be some confusion
between the view that the liability of the surety is a matter of contract,
determined by a construction of the bond, and the view that the liability
of the surety is determined by the statute or rule of court under which the
the bond is exacted. In a current action I on a ne execat bond, required
in proceedings for the support of a wife, the court denied liability of the
surety to pay the support order, the bond being conditioned only upon
the appearance of the husband; while in an action on a superscdeas bond,
the court disregarded specific provisions of the bond relating to counsel
fees, and held that all conditions not prescribed by the statute were sur-
plusage.2 The appellate court in the first case assumed that the trial court
could have prescribed a bond conditioned both upon appearance and payment
of the ultimate award. At risk of barratry, we wonder if the appellant in
the second case would have a cause of action to recover unearned premiums?
The matter, in our opinion, should be regarded as one of adjectival law,
as it was in the second case, rather than one of contract.
Negotiable instruments. While in the hands of the original payee, a
negotiable instrument is subject to personal as well as real defenses; that
is to say, defenses which are cut off by negotiation are still available to
20. State ex reL Peck v. Chase, 91 Fla. 413, 107 So. 541 (1926).
21. Schriver v. Tucker, 42 So.2d 707 (Fla. 1949). Where there is an assault with
intent to commit rape, abandonment of purpose because of an emission does not meet the
requirements of the defense of voluntary desistance without outside interference or
unusual resistance, This decision is satisfactory. Roundtree v. State, 43 So.2d 12 (1949)
In Hurley v. State, 43 So.2d 179 (1949) reversed a conviction of manslaughter on the
ground that the evidence was not sufficient to support the judgment.
* The cases reviewed in this section are found in Volume 43, SOUTHERN REPORTER
(Secoxoi) SERtEs) ending with the advance sheets issued February 16, 1950 (No. 7).
1. Lieberman v. Lieberman, 43 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1949).
2. Bernstein v. Bernstein, 43 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1949).
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the maker. Under plea of payment, the maker can offer in evidence the
original contract of sale under which the note was given, to prove that
the agent who negotiated the contract had implied authority to receive
payment. 3 Payment to the authorized agent of a holder is sufficient to
discharge a negotiable instrument, and agency is a matter of fact to be
proved by competent evidence. The parole evidence rule has no application
in such situations. In disposing of cases in commercial law, the Supreme
Court of Florida is committed to the doctrine that it will apply the stand-
ards of the common man, who may or may not be different from the
merchant, banker or broker who normally engages in commercial transactions. 4
Construction of contract (lease). The construction of a contract or a
conveyance is a question of law for the court. The terms of a contract are
a question of fact for the jury, but the parole evidence rule makes a
written contract or conveyance the only admissible evidence of its terms.
Parole evidence may be considered when there is ambiguity, or in cases
of reformation to prove that the written contract does not represent the
actual agreement. In the light of these rules, we find difficulty in under-
standing a current case O in which declaratory judgment proceedings were
had to determine whether or not a lease executed in 1942 "for the duration
of the national emergency now existing" was still in effect. The lower court
disposed of the case on a motion to dismiss.6 The appellate court reversed,
holding that the petition stated a cause of action to which an answer would
be required. What could be produced under such an answer within the
parole evidence rule, except evidence of circumstances which the court
already knows judicially, is beyond our comprehension. The general trend
of cases construing the phrase, "duration of the war," is to construe non-
technically in the case of contracts between private parties, making the end
of hostilities or demobilization the test, and technically in the case of
statutes, making nothing short of a treaty of peace suffice?
3. This evidence was excluded by the trial court, apparently on the theory that
the negotiable instrument embodied the whole contract, or that payment in due course
can be made only to the holder personally. The former proposition would have been
true if the instrument had been negotiated. The action was by a corporation, payee of
a note. The maker offered in evidence cancelled checks payable to and indorsed by
the president personally. The trial court excluded the contract, which apparently
would have shown that the notes were given for merchandise purchased and that it
was executed in behalf of the corporation by its president. Posey v. Hunt Furniture
Co., 43 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1949).
4. Terrellism: "The judge works with the implements and tools of the common
man and it therefore follows that, he should use the standards of the common man
in the disposition of his causes." 43 So.2d 343, 4 (Fla. 1949).
5. Syndicate Gramercy v. Daoud, 43 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1949).
6. We construe the motion to dismiss as a demurrer raising questions of law,
and the granting of the motion as a finding that the lease had not expired. If that
is its effect, the trial court may have erred in the form of its decree, which should
have declared the lease to be effective, and the case should have been treated as one
of procedure.
7. See Riggs and Updike, Real Property, 1946 ANNUAL SURVEY or AMERICAN
LAw 894 (1947).
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PROPERTY. Joint bank accounts. Florida has at last & cut the Gordian
knot and determined that the opening of a joint bank account, payable to
either party or the survivor, creates without more a "joint tenancy" with
jus accresceirdi, a position which it had previously refused to take.9 We
have recently noted that an ownership of personal property by husband and
wife as tenants by the entireties is recognized, 10 in spite of the fact that
before the emancipation of married women such a form of ownership
would have been impossible. Similar considerations apply with respect to
joint tenancy, this being a form of tenure primarily of real property. Pos-
session and title are so closely related in the concept of personalty that
unless the person having possession be regarded as a bailee, trustee or
agent for his co-owner or owners, practical difficulties are encountered.
While the statute 1 oi which the court relied applies specifically to the
construction of conveyances and legacies of personal as well as real property,
it has never before been regarded as controlling.' 2 Other courts have not
found the problem so easy of solution. t 3 While admitting that a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship may be created in intangible personal
property if the debtor's contract is made payable to both, they find power
in either party to receive payment inconsistent with joint ownership. Fur-
thermore, the mere opening of a joint account with a bank without trans-
fer of power to receive payment, symbolized in the pass-book, demonstrates
an intent to make a gift at a future time, like a Totten trust, the "poor
man's will." That was the view taken by previous Florida cases, which
were distinguished in the present as if holding another theory.' 4 The new
decision has at least the merit of simplifying what would otherwise be a
difficult problem. It is to be noted that the case could have been decided
under the statute relating specifically to such deposits.' 5
8. Crabtree v. Garcia, 43 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1949).
9. Crossman v. Naphitali, 160 Fla. 148, 33 So.2d 726 (1948). See Klein, Personal
Property, 1948 AN-iNUAL SuRVEY oF AMERICAN LAw 675 (1949).
10. Rader v. First National Bank, 42 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1949) discussed supra, p. 214.
11. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1941). The statute relates to devises, transfers and
conveyances, but is specifically applicable to personal as well as to real property.
It does not necessarily follow that the statute changed the common law rule with
respect to personal property, as it most certainly did as to real.
12. Crossman v. Naphtali, supra; Cerny v. Cerny, 152 Fla. 333, 1I So.2d 777 (1943).
13. For the views currently entertained, and the frequency with which cases of
this type have been before the courts in recent years, see 1946 ANNUAL SURVEY Or
AMERICAN LAW 887 (1947) ; 1947 id. 846 (1948) ; 1948 id. 675 (1949).
14. Apparently on the theory that the language of the certificate of membership
and the application in Crossman v. Naphtali, supra, when read and construed together,
(lid not show the requisite intent, the view taken in a Case Comment, 1 U. OF FLA.
L.REv. 462 (1948), which the court cited. The court in Crossman v. Naphtali, how-
ever, used this language: ". . . because John Novak never surrendered dominion." 160 Fla.
148, 150, 33 So.2d 726, 7 (1948).
15. FLA. STAT. § 653.17 (1941). Savings banks are authorized to pay the survivor
and that payment is made a valid acquittance. This was construed as relating only
to the discharge of the bank's liability, not to the depositor's title in Cerny v. Cerny,
supra.
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Creditors' lien. There are certain instances in which a person having
rightfully obtained possession of the personal property of another, may
retain possession until claims against the owner are satisfied. Specific
examples are the common law liens of the carrier, innkeeper, factor or
artificer, and the seller's lien. Except in such instances, a bailment cannot
be converted into a mortgage or pledge simply because the owner has
become indebted to the bailee. This principle found expression in a recent
case " in which the Supreme Court of Florida held that a counterclaim
for damages cannot be filed in an action of replevin. From a strictly pro-
cedural approach, the case may present some difficulty,1 7 but when it is
remembered that the effect of allowing the counterclaim would be to con-
vert the bailee's unsecured claim into a pledge, the wisdom of the rule is at
once apparent.
Mec anics' liens. A materialman may acquire a lien against real property
where specially fabricated materials are not incorporated into the improve-
ment or delivered on the premises. This can occur, however, only when the
owner of the land or the lessee has prevented delivery, according to a recent
case.' 8 A general contractor does not have implied authority to act for the
owner in this respect. Failure adequately to describe the real property
is fatal to a claim of lien."' Where a lien cannot be asserted because the
claim is defective, the circuit court cannot retain jurisdiction of fore-
closure proceedings to enter a judgment for damages. A statute giving
laborers a reasonable attorney's fee where it is necessary to resort to
summary proceedings to enforce a mechanic's lien against property of the
immediate employer, was held constitutional. 2o
DECEDENTS' ESTATES. Estoppel to claim dower. Until the time in which
to file her election to take dower has expired, a widow is not absolutely
estopped to claim dower by accepting benefits or taking property devised or
bequeathed to her under her husband's will. She will be required, however,
to account for what she has received, and there may be situations, difficult
to conceive, in which she will be unable to restore what she has received
and the estoppel be absolute. To hold the estoppel absolute in every instance
would be to defeat the policy of the law which affords the wife the min-
imum of time in which to weigh the relative advantages of her legacy and
her dower share. This decision, 2 1 in the light of the recent case of Jo-nes
16. Seven Seas Frozen Products v. Fast Frozen Foods, 43 So2d 181 (Fla. 1949).
17. Mr. Burnes has promised to criticize this aspect of the case. See Adjectival
Low, infra.
18. Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Joseph Langner, Inc., 43 So.2d 335 (Fla.
1949). Leases contemplated improvement by the lessees. A general contractor, em-
ployed by the tenant, ordered steel which was specially fabricated and retained at
Bethlehem, Pa., awaiting his shipping instructions.
19. Ibid.
20. Hunter v. Flowers, 43 So.2d 435 (FIa. 1949).
21. Griley v. Griley. 43 So2d 350 (Fla. 1949). Testator died domiciled in Florida,
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v. Niebergall,2 2 shows that the Supreme Court holds the view of that
case, which we took, that while the constitutional and statutory provisions
relating to homestead cannot be avoided by the application of the doctrine
of estoppel, the party asserting rights under such circumstances must ac-
count for the benefits he has otherwise received. 23
Concurrent jurisdiction of probate and equity. While the county judge
has been given broad equitable powers in all cases involving the settlement
of decedents' estates, 24 his jurisdiction is not exclusive. In this respect,
Florida has not followed a modern trend. 25 For this reason, a bill to
rescind a contract made prior to the death of the decedent may be main-
tained in the circuit court. 26 The court seems to have regarded the case
as one involving an election of remedies. This might have been true if the
complainant had filed a claim for breach of contract with the county judge
and had then filed a bill in equity to rescind. The case does not neces-
sarily decide that the county judge would have jurisdiction to entertain the
bill for rescission, or that relief would be barred by failure tpa file a claim
within the period of the statute of nonclaim. 27
PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS. Collateral attack upon void mar-
riages. Not only is a marriage void when one party thereto is the husband
or wife of a third person, but so also is a divorce and property settlement
terminating such a relationship, according to a recent decision. 28 Because
the marriage is wholly void, the marriage and the subsequent divorce are
subject to collateral attack. While allowing the collateral attack, the
Supreme Court of Florida treated the mortgage as voidable rather than
having disposed by will of property in Florida, Panama, and the Canal Zone. His
widow filed an election to take dower and petitioned for assignment thereof. In his
answer to the petition, the executor asserted that the widow had taken possession of
property under the will in Panama and the Canal Zone, and had not offered to return
it. An order striking the answer was reversed.
22. 42 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1949), discussed supra, p. 217.
23. On the first hearing, Barns, J., dissented, taking the view, which he also took,
dissenting, in Jones v. Niebergall, that there was an absolute estoppel. When his
opinion prevailed after re-argument, it was modified to hold that the widow was not
estopped but was accountable for what she had received.
24. In re Warner's Estate, 160 Fla. 461, 35 So.2d 296 (1948), discussed in
Synopsis, 2 MIAMI L.Q. 312 (1948).
25. MODEL PROBATE CoDE § 6, in SIMES AN.D BASvE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW
46 (1946).
26. Plasman v. Roach, 43 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1949). Decedent entered into a lease,
a partnership, and a stock purchase agreement with plaintiff. These were alleged
to be voidable on some equitable grounds, the exact nature of which is not revealed.
A bill to rescind, to impose a constructive trust, and for an accounting, was dismissed.
27. See Wilson and McGeehee, Probate Claims in Florida, I U. oF FLA. L. REV.
1 (1948). If the right of rescission is asserted defensively, it may not be barred. Starke
v. Pfender, 146 Fla. 262, 200 So.2d 850 (1941).
28. Beidler v. Beidler, 43 Sold 329 (Fla. 1949). Paul and Anne were married
twice in 1940 and 1942, and were divorced twice in 1942 and 1946. Actually Anne
was the wife of another, but Paul was in the merchant marine and was seldom at
home. Suspecting his wife, Paul brought a bill for annulment, but this was dismissed
with prejudice when he failed to produce evidence. He then obtained a divorce. The
bill in the present case was predicated on the discovery of new evidence.
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void in some other respects, charging the innocent husband with the sup-
port of the guilty wife, and refusing to make the wife account for the
appreciation in value of real property purchased with the husband's money.
The issues were involved in the review of a complicated accounting, and
the mistake was doubtless inadvertent, particularly since the court declared
soon after that the effect of voiding a marriage is to make the relationship
meretricious from its inception. 2 Further evidence of ingenuity is found
in the formula, that because there is a duty on the part of the guilty wife
to disclose the existence of her spouse, it is unnecessary to offer specific
proof of fraud. It is important to remember, however, that while the mar-
riage may be void, a gift by the husband to his putative wife is a com-
pleted transfer of property and must be set aside for cause. Since the
mistake is strictly one of law and not one of fact, it is necessary to show
fraud or breach of a fiduciary relationship.
While the decisions are to the effect that a void marriage is subject
to collateral attack, it is still necessary to frame the collateral action be-
tween proper parties. The second wife may not attack the first divorce,
but she may sue for an annulment of the second (void) marriage or to
enjoin her illegitimate husband from demanding access to her bed and
board. Where there is no jurisdiction to annul a marriage because neither
party is domiciled within the state, recourse to declaratory judgment pro-
ceedings as a subterfuge will be prevented. The ubiquitous State, third
party to every divorce, may not be invoked by the plaintiff to cure the
defect. The court chose a novel way to express its disapproval, rephrasing
the well-known maxim thus: Equity will not permit a plaintiff to soil his
clean hands. All this was presented in a case which, because of the notoriety
of the parties and the curiosity of the public, was bound to be the hard
case which makes bad law.s0
TORTS. Negligence: duty with respect to children on highway. In a
recent case, originating in an action by the parents for the death of a three-
year-old child, killed while crossing a highway, the court found the evidence
sufficient to support the findings of the jury that the driver was negligent
and that the person to whom custody of the child had been entrusted was
not guilty of contributory negligence; but stated some interesting rules of
law: one, that anyone who runs over a child in the highway without know-
29. deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1949). Obviously the court
does not place the same construction upon the word "meretricious" (from tuerere, to
work for hire) that we do. It may confuse the rule that a relationship meretricious
in its inception cannot ripen into a common law marriage.
30. deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1942). The first divorce was
obtained in Florida while the parties, nationals of foreign states, were in the United
States as alien visitors on temporary visas, which would show fraud upon the Florida
court. The court would not permit the plaintiff to waive the protection of the decree
because that would be to brand her as a prostitute; but it suggested that a solution
be sought in another jurisdiction. Plaintiff did not claim to be a resident of FloridaI
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ing what has happened, is driving too fast; another, that a three-year-old
child is incapable of contributory negligence; another, that the adult custo-
dian is not required to walk the child on a leash; and again, that the safe
rate of speed varies with the character of the area traversed.1
Damages. The elements of damage to be recovered in an action by
by parents for the death of a child are recompense for parental pain and suffer-
ing and loss of the child's prospective services until majority. The court might
also have included medical and funeral expenses which the parents have met.
The jury is the best judge of the value of the first two elements, which
are not readily susceptible of mathematical proof. The court found it
impossible, while admitting that five thousand dollars would have been
excessive when Mr. Justice Terrell was called to the bar, to say that
$55,000 was too much. This was not predicated upon the depreciation of
the value of money as in recent cases, but upon the appreciation of the
ability of the medical profession to measure the extent of the effects upon
the physical and mental well-being of the victim of a serious emotional
shock: truly atomic jurisprudence. One cannot help feeling, with the dis-
senting justice, that the verdict was the result of prejudice and sympathy.8 2
Workmen's compensation. The workmen's compensation law provides
that a workman is not entitled to compensation when injury has been occa-
sioned primarily by the employee with willful intent to injure or kill himself.
This does not prevent recovery where an employee died by suicide as the
result of an uncontrollable impulse caused by the pain resulting from an
otherwise compensable injury. While this rule appears to be settled, the
exact role of the appellate court in a recent case seems to be mistaken. 33
The deputy commissioner, who found against the widow, evidently found
that the mental condition of the deceased was such that the suicidal act
was willtul and intentional and not the result of an uncontrollable impulse.
The Supreme Court apparently substituted its own finding of fact rather
than ruling as a matter of law that the evidence did not support the deputy
commissioner's finding. The case was undefended, and the public will in
the end absorb the cost; but we have already seen the hardship on the
workman which may occur when failure to observe the usual limits on the
scope of review results in a decision adverse to the workman.3 4
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31. Winner v. Sharp, 43 So2d 634 (Fla. 1949).
32. Winner v. Sharp, 43 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1949).
33. Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1949).
34. See Lester Harris, Appeals in Workmen's Compensation Cases, 2 MIAMI
L.Q. 215 (1948).
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PROCEDURE *
APPEAL. Law of the Case. In an appeal from a final decree in a mort-
gage foreclosure suit rendered pursuant to a mandate upon a previous appeal,'
the court admitted that its decision on the previous appeal was erroneous in
allowing the mortgagor a credit; the allowance of such credit was based on
the erroneous assumption, drawn from the record, that the mortgagee was in
possession of all the mortgaged property, whereas such possession was in fact
controversial.2 The application of the rule of the "law of the case," which has
been defined "as the points adjudicated by an appellate court upon a writ of
error or upon appeal and are no longer open for consideration," 3 may be
relaxed. "The court is not bound at the will of litigants to revise its previous
holdings, but, when itself convinced that it should, it can." 4
Supcrsedeas Bond. An illegal or improperly required condition of lia-
bility in a supersedeas bond will be regarded as surplusage and ignored. In
Bernstein v. Bernstein5 a suit for separate maintenance and an adjudication
that certain realty had been conveyed in fraud of the marital rights of the
plaintiff-appellee, by a final decree the plaintiff-appellee was awarded a pe-
cuniary sum for separate maintenance and an order that the realty be sold
to satisfy payment of such sum, the conveyance having been adjudged
fraudulent. One of the two defendants-appellants, the transferee of the
realty, appealed that part of the decree respecting the fraudulent conveyance
and, in order to stay the order of sale, posted a supersedeas bond "condi-
tioned to pay to the plaintiff . . . all costs, damages and expenses, including
attorneys' fees which may be incurred by the [plaintiff] in the event said
appeal is dismissed or the cause affirmed by the Supreme Court." The
supreme Court affirmed the decree of the lower court, and the realty was sold
for a sum appreciably more than the decretal award. Thereafter, the plaintiff-
appellee recovered a judgment on the supersedeas bond against the defendants
-appellants, the principal and surety thereof, for attorneys' fees and interest
accruing on the pecuniary decree as a result of the appeal by the defendants-
appellants. It was from that judgment the present appeal was prosecuted. The
court held it error to exact an appeal bond conditioned to pay such attorneys'
fees, and therefore such condition was ineffective and superfluous. It was
further held to be error to require defendants-appellants to pay the interest
on the final decree accruing after the appeal was taken thereon, since the
spouse against whom the personal, final, pecuniary decree was rendered would
be required to pay such interest; plaintiff-appellee would not be permitted
* The cases reviewed in this section are found in Volume 43 nos. 1 through 8.
1. Joyner v. Bernard, 160 Fla. 681, 36 So.2d 364 (1948).
2. Bernard v. Joyner, 43 So2d 901 (Fla. 1949).
3. Note 1 supra at 365.
4. Seagraves v. Wallace, 69 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1934).
5. 43 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1949).
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two recoveries; and therefore, the provision in the bond respecting interest
was also ineffective and superfluous.
COUNTERCLAIM. Joinder of forms of action. In Seven Seas Frozen
Products v. Fast Frozen Foods,6 an action in replevin, a demurrer to a
compulsory counterclaim sounding in contract was sustained on the ground
that the statute on joinder of forms of action7 forbids joining replevin with
other forms of action. The statute regarding compulsory counterclaims re-
quires the defendant to "state as a counterclaim, any claim, whether the
subject of a pending action or not, which he has against the plaintiff, arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
action .. ." 8 The counterclaim statute, which is broad indeed, was deemed
to be in "apparent conflict" with the joinder statute, and the court applied
a rule of statutory interpretation-that the specific, the joinder statute, con-
trols the general, the counterclaim statute. The court observed that the pur-
pose of the joinder statute would be destroyed if the filling of counterclaims
were allowed, since it would inject into the trial issues of an entirely different
nature.
The "apparent conflict" between the two statutes seems illusory, since
the joinder statute, passed in 1861,9 obviously referred only to plural counts
in the plaintiff's declaration; only recoupment and set-off were then extant;
the counterclaim statute was passed in 1941.10 Moreover, even if the statutes
do conflict, the rule of statutory interpretation which the court conveniently
applied is hardly a revelation of the legislative intent which, in passing the
compulsory counterclaim provisions, was directed-as the court recently
stated in Newton v. Mitchell "-toward the end of "expedition and economy
so that claims originating in a single happening may be tried and determined
in one action." It seems this decision is predicated on considerations other
than procedural propriety.' 2
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. Parties and subject matter. In deMarigny v.
deMarigny s the appellant-petitioner married one of the appellees-respond-
ents subsequent to a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage of the appellees-
respondents. In a suit from which an appeal and petition for a writ of
certiorari were taken to the supreme court, the appellant-petitioner sought a
declaratory judgment for a determination of the force and effect of the de-
cree, which was valid in every respect on the face of the record. The peti-
tioner's bill alleged that a fraud had been perpetrated on the circuit court in
6. 43 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1949).
7. FLA. STAT. § 46.08 (1941).
8. FLA. STAT. § 52.11(1) (1941).
9. Fla. Laws 1861, c. 1096, § 12.
10. Laws 1941, c. 20426, § 6.
11. 42 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1949).
12. Stephenson, Quarterly Synopsis, 4 MAmn! L.Q., 219 (1950).
13. 43 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1949).
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the divorce suit in that when the suit was instituted the plaintiff and de-
fendant were foreign nationals and the plaintiff had not resided in Florida
for more than ninety days preceding the commencement of the suit. The
question before the court was whether the statute respecting declaratory judg-
ments and decrees" embraces a determination of the validity of such a decree.
The court applied the principle of ejusdein yeneris and concluded that
such a determination was not within the scope of the statute. "The words
'or other article, memorandum or instrument in writing' are limited by the
words 'or by a municipal ordinance, contract, deed, will, franchise.' In other
words, the 'instrument in writing' should be the same kind of class as those
instruments which are specifically enumerated and such phrase connotes only
instruments of the same class or variety. . . Neither a 'judgment' nor a
'decree' of a court of competent jurisdiction can be said to be similar to
'a municipal ordinance, contract, deed, will, franchise.' "15
As a second string to its bow the court said that even if the statute
expressly included a determination of the validity of a decree, a declaratory
judgment proceeding is not an appropriate method of questioning a decree
unless it "has become the source of definite rights and is unclear or ambigu-
ous." 16 This decree was clear and unambiguous.
The court added, "Our declaratory decree statute is no substitute for
established procedure for review of final judgments or decrees. Nor is it a
device for collateral attack upon them." 17
JUDGMENTS. Collateral attack. Another question before the court in the
deMarigny case was whether the appellant-petitioner could maintain her
bill as an independent bill in equity. The court based a negative answer upon
the fact that this proceeding was a collateral attack, at most a voidable divorce
decree, the validity of which would have to be impeached by matters dehors
the record; a collateral attack may not be based on such matters.
The court further said appellant-petitioner had no standing to bring
this action because neither party to a divorce proceeding can impeach the
decree, and even if appellant-petitioner is considered to represent the state
as an interested third party which is not foreclosed to impeach the decree,
it is in the best interests of society not to upset the decree. To do otherwise
14. FLA. STAT. § 87.02 (Cum. Supp. 1947). The Statute states: "Any person claim-
ing to be interested or who may be in doubt as to his right under a deed, will, contract
or other article, memorandum or instrument in writing or whose rights, status or other
equitable or legal relations are affected by a statute, or any regulation made under
statutory authority, or by municipal ordinance, contract, deed, will, franchise or other
article, memorandum or instrument in writing may have determined any question of
construction or validity arising under such statute, regulation, municipal ordinance, con-
tract, deed, will, franchise, or other article, memorandum or instrument in writing, or
any part thereof, and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other equitable or legal
relations thereunder."
15. deMarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1949).
16. Ibid.
17. Id. at 445.
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would be a declaration that appellant-petitioner lived in adultery with appellee-
respondent whom she married; moreover, it would encourage any party to a
fraudulent divorce decree, valid on the face of the record ". . . to conspire
with another person to enter into a marriage with him or her with the
sole purpose in mind of having said spouse thereafter bring a proceeding
to impeach the divorce decree and thus accomplish indirectly, by means of
such conspiracy and fraud, that which could not be accomplished directly." i&
The court stated, moreover, that since the divorce decree had not ad-
versely affected the status of appellant-petitioner's rights existing at the time
of entry of the divorce decree-for she occupied no status and had no rights
at that time-she as a stranger to the suit was not entitled to impeach the
decree.
JURISDICTION. Appellate. The court intentionally filled a gap in our
appellate jurisdiction. Appeals lie from the small claims courts to the circuit
courts under Florida Statutes, 1941, chapter 61 19 although that chapter only
pertains to appeals from county courts, county judges' courts and justice of
the peace courts, and chapter 21915, Acts of 1943, which created the small
claims courts, makes no provision for appeals therefrom.20 The decision was
based on the fact that the jurisdiction of the small claims courts and the jus-
tice of the peace courts is coordinate.
Courts. A complainant who seeks relief on a cause of action for equitable
relief, a portion of which can be procured in the probate court, may at his
option avail himself of the more adequate, direct and expeditious remedy
afforded by a court of equity rather than be restricted respecting such portion
to the probate court. Hence, in Plasman v. Roach 21 where a bill of com-
plaint which was filed against the defendant individually, and as administrator
of an estate, stated a good cause of action over which a court of equity has
jurisdiction, it was proper for the plaintiff to proceed in that court.
Transference of action. A circuit court judge transferred sua sponte
an action at law pending in the Circuit Court of Dade County to the Civil
Court of Record of Dade County because the jurisdictional amount of the
action lay within the jurisdiction of the latter court rather than the former.
There is no constitutional or statutory provision vesting the Circuit Court of
Dade County with power to transfer such a case to an inferior court for
further proceedings, and, therefore, the circuit court judge should have ordered
the action dismissed.22
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. How'land v. Cates28 emphasizes the importance
18. Id. at 446, 447.
19. Chapter 61 provides that judgments of certain courts will be reviewed by ap-
peal, the manner of which being set forth therein.
20. Sachs v. Lalumera, 43 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1949).
21. 43 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1949).
22. Caudell v. Leventis, 43 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1949).
23. 43 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1949).
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of complying with procedural requirements in moving for a new trial. In
accordance with the apposite statute,24 the plaintiff within four days after
the rendition of an adverse verdict and during the same term, applied for and
was granted the maximum extension of time--fifteen days-to make and
present a motion for a new trial. In such cases of extension of time, a copy
of the motion to be presented to the judge must be served on the opposite
party, or his attorney, with three days' notice of the time and place that
the motion will be presented and heard. The plaintiff did not serve a copy
of his motion on the defendant until the day of presentation of the motion,
the fifteenth day. Thus, the trial court properly allowed defendant's motion
to strike plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
MOTION TO STRIK-E. The relevancy or materiality of allegations is the
proper test to be applied in ruling on a motion to strike allegations from an
answer in the probate court-a test which has its counterpart in courts of
equity. In Griley v. Griley 25 the testator's widow filed a petition specifying
her election to take dower, and the executor filed an answer in which he
alleged that prior to the filing of said petition the widow had taken possession
of certain property in Panama which was devised to her under the decedent's
will. While taking possession of such property may not work an estoppel to
make an election to take dower, such fact is at least to be considered in setting
off and making an allotment of dower; it is, therefore, pertinent to the
petition and should not be stricken.
PROCESS. The constitutionality of the procedure of the newly created
civil claims court26 was upheld.3T - It was contended inter alia that the notice
to the defendant required under the act creating the court made no provision
that such notice run in the name of the State of Florida, a state constitutional
requirement.t5 The court held that the constitutional provision referred "only
to that character of process which under the common law would run in the
name of the King," and it was not convinced that the notice required by the
act is within that class. However, the court went on to say that even if the
notice fell within that class, the notice taken with the "Statement of claim" is
ample to meet the constitutional requirement. It went on to advance a third
reason to substantiate its holding: The civil claims court has "ample power
to correct the notice and statement in such manner as may be necessary to
make it conform to legal requirements." 29
Further, the court upheld the manner of service of process in the civil
claims court. Service of process by registered mail where proof of receipt
24. FLA. SrAT. § 54.24 (1941).
25. 43 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1949).
26. Laws of 1949, Chapter 25575.
27. State ex rel. Murphy-McDonald Builders' Supply Co. v. Parks, 43 So.2d 347
(Fla. 1949).
28. FLA. Cons'r. Art. V, § 37.
29. Cf. Gilmer v. Bird, 15 Fla, 410 (1875).
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thereof is shown is not violative of due process of law since the notice is as
effective to advise the defendant of the charge or claim against him as if
made and shown by a sheriff's return.
TRiAL. Jury. In rejecting another contention of unconstitutionality in the
Murphy-McDonald case, that the requirement that a person demanding a
jury trial in the civil claims court deposit with the judge or his clerk a sum
of money in the amount the judge fixes as reasonable to secure the payment
of costs incurred by reason of the jury trial, the court said, "Costs should
not be such as to make it difficult or impossible to secure a jury but we think
the court has the discretion to fix costs in such manner as to prevent this." 80
Objection to instruction. It is important to distinguish between an in-
struction and a charge. During the couise of the trial the plaintiff placed in
evidence, over defendant's objection, a certain paper. After all the evi-
dence was in but before the argument of counsel and the court's charge on
the law, the trial court instructed the jury that the ruling on the admission
of such evidence was reversed and that the jury should disregard it. The
plaintiff did not object to the instruction. While the appellate court may
review "without exception having been taken at the trial, any question of law
involved in any adverse . . . instruction ... the party complaining must object
prior to such instruction being given." 31 It is not necessary, however, to ob-
ject to the giving of a charge by the court.32 Since the judge's statement to
the jury constituted an instruction, the plaintiff by failing to object lost his
right to a review thereof on appeal. 8
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30. See note 27 supra at 349.
31. Ft.A. STAr. § 59.07(1) (Cum. Supp. 1947).
32. Id. at § 59.07(2).
33. Howland v. Cates, 43 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1949).
